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1 Introduction
There are several relations which may fall short of genuine identity, but
which behave like identity in important respects. Such grades of discrimi-
nation have recently been the subject of much philosophical and technical
discussion.
Much of this discussion has been fuelled by considering the Principle of
the Identity of Indiscernibles : the claim that indiscernible objects are always
identical. The Principle is obviously of direct metaphysical interest (see
[13]). But, within the philosophy of mathematics, the Principle has risen to
prominence via the question of whether platonistically-minded structuralists
can countenance structures with indiscernible but distinct positions (see [26,
§1]). And, within the philosophy of physics, the central question has been
whether quantum mechanics presented real-world counterexamples to the
Principle (see [22]). As discussion has progressed, though, it has become
increasingly clear that we must distinguish between different versions of ‘the’
Principle, corresponding to different notions of indiscernibility. This has
spurred several philosophers to investigate the logical properties of these
different notions (see [8], [17], [18]).
This paper completes that logical investigation. It exhaustively details,
not just the properties of grades of indiscernibility, but the properties of
all of the grades of discrimination. Indeed, this paper answers all of the
mathematical questions that are natural at this level of abstraction.
There are three broad families of grades of discrimination. Grades of
indiscernibility are defined in terms of satisfaction of certain first-order for-
mulas, either with or without access to a primitive symbol that stands for
genuine identity. They have been the focus of much recent philosophical
attention. Grades of symmetry are defined in terms of isomorphisms. More
specifically, they are defined in terms of symmetries (also known as auto-
morphisms) on a structure. These grades have received some philosophical
attention, though in a slightly less cohesive way than the grades of indis-
cernibility. Finally, grades of relativity are defined in terms of relativeness
correspondences, analogously to the grades of symmetry. The notion of a
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relativeness correspondence has been studied by model-theorists, but is en-
tirely absent from the philosophical literature on grades of discrimination.
This paper rectifies this situation, introducing grades of relativity for the
first time.
I mentioned, earlier, that the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles
has been the main motivating force for interest in grades of discrimination.
But it is now worth pausing to consider broader reasons for investigating the
logical properties of the grades of discrimination.
The simplest reason to care about grades of discrimination is that they
allow us to calibrate relationships of similarity and difference. More am-
bitiously, though, we might hope that some grade of discrimination will
provide us with a genuinely illuminating answer to the question: When are
objects identical? To take a simple example: set theory tells us that sets are
identical iff they share all their members. Consequently, some grade of indis-
cernibility provides a suitable criterion of identity in set-theoretic contexts.
To take a more contentious example: we might somehow become convinced
that nature abhors a (non-trivial) symmetry. If so, then some grade of sym-
metry will provide a suitable criterion of identity in empirical contexts. The
general hope, then, is that our grades of discrimination may furnish us with
some non-trivial criterion of identity (in some context or other).
This search for a non-trivial criterion of identity need not be reductive.
We might simply seek an illuminating constraint upon the conditions under
which objects can be distinct. That said, some philosophers have hoped to
find a reductive criterion for identity; that is, they have hoped to replace the
identity primitive with some defined grade of discrimination. This reductive
ambition is most prominent among those who have defended some Principle
of Identity of Indiscernibles; such philosophers have therefore focussed on
the various grades of indiscernibility. However, reductive ambitions might,
in principle, be served equally well by considering either grades of symmetry
or grades of relativity. (I revisit this in §8.)
Advancing a criterion of identity is not, however, simply a matter of se-
lecting some grade of discrimination. As we shall see, each grade of discrim-
ination is defined with respect to a (model-theoretic) signature. So, consider
a signature which contains just a few monadic predicates which stand for
eye colour. If we present a non-trivial criterion of identity, in the form of a
grade of discrimination defined with respect to this signature, then we shall
be forced to say, absurdly, that there is at most one person with brown eyes.
Consequently, any philosopher who wants to advance a non-trivial criterion
of identity must not only select some appropriate grade of discrimination,
but must also stipulate the particular signature she has in mind. (I shall
revisit this point several times below.)
In this paper, though, I am not aiming to advance any particular criterion
of identity. My aim is only to provide a mathematical toolkit for anyone who
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is interested in criteria of identity, whether reductive or non-reductive.
That toolkit is structured around three main results. Theorem 3.3 com-
pletely characterises the entailments between the grades of discrimination.
Theorem 4.8 establishes a Galois Connection between isomorphisms and rel-
ativeness correspondences, which enables us better to understand the rela-
tionships between grades of symmetry and grades of relativity. And Theorem
6.12, is a Beth–Svenonius Theorem for logics without identity. By combin-
ing these three results, I answer several subsidiary questions concerning the
grades of discrimination, including: which grades are equivalence relations
(§5); which grades can be captured using sets of first-order formulas (§8);
how they behave in finitary cases (§7); and how they behave in elementary
extensions of structures (§6 and §9).
I now state some notational conventions.
I always use ‘L ’ to denote an arbitrary signature, i.e. a collection of
constants, predicates and function-symbols. The philosophical discussion of
grades of indiscernibility tends to be restricted to relational signatures, i.e.
signatures which contain only predicates.1 There are reasonable philosophi-
cal motivations for this: if we assume that each constant names exactly one
object, then we seem to presuppose that we understand rather a lot about the
notion of identity before we begin (see e.g. [2], [8, pp. 40–1]); more generally,
the very idea of a function seems to presuppose the notion of identity; hence,
if we want to avoid prejudging certain philosophical questions about iden-
tity, it might be wise to restrict our attention to relational signatures. The
model-theoretic discussion of these issues is, though, less often restricted to
relational signatures. There is a sensible technical motivation for this: many
of the results hold in the more general case. Since this paper aims to provide
philosophers with technical results, I shall allow signatures to contain both
constants and functions, but I shall comment on the relational case when
it is interestingly different. For technical ease, I treat constants as 0-place
function-symbols.
Where L is a signature, the L +-formulas are the first-order formulas
formed in the usual way using any L -symbols and any symbols from stan-
dard first-order logic with identity. In particular, then, they may contain the
symbol ‘=’, which always stands for (genuine) identity. The L −-formulas are
those formed without using the symbol ‘=’. L +n is the set of L +-formulas
with free variables among ‘v1’, . . ., ‘vn’; similarly for L −n .
I use swash fonts for structures and italic fonts for their associated do-
mains. So, where M is an L -structure, its domain is M . Where e =⟨e1, . . . , en⟩ and pi is a function, pi(e) = ⟨pi(e1), . . . , pi(en)⟩. Where Π is a
two place relation, I write dΠe to abbreviate ⟨d1, e1⟩, . . . , ⟨dn, en⟩ ∈ Π.
1An exception is Ladyman et al. [18, §6].
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2 Twelve grades of discrimination
I start by defining six grades of indiscernibility ; three grades ofL −-indiscerni-
bility, and three grades of L +-indiscernibility.2
Definition 2.1. For any L -structure M with a, b ∈M :
1. a ≈m b in M iff M⊧ φ(a) ↔ φ(b) for all φ ∈ L −1
2. a ≈p b in M iff M⊧ φ(a, b) ↔ φ(b, a) for all φ ∈ L −2
3. a ≈ b in M iff M⊧ φ(a, e) ↔ φ(b, e) for all n < ω, all φ ∈ L −n+1 and all
e ∈Mn
Similarly:
4. a =m b in M iff M⊧ φ(a) ↔ φ(b) for all φ ∈ L +1
5. a =p b in M iff M⊧ φ(a, b) ↔ φ(b, a) for all φ ∈ L +2
6. a = b in M iff a is identical to b
Here, ‘p’ indicates pairwise indiscernibility; ‘m’ indicates monadic indiscerni-
bility; and no subscript indicates complete indiscernibility.
There are several alternative characterisations of ≈, two of which will prove
useful (see Casanovas et al. [7, p. 508] and Ketland [17, Theorem 3.17]):
Lemma 2.2. For any L -structure M, the following are equivalent:
1. a ≈ b in M
2. M⊧ φ(a, e) ↔ φ(b, e) for all n < ω, all atomic φ ∈ L −n+1 and all e ∈Mn
3. M⊧ φ(a, a) ↔ φ(a, b) for all φ ∈ L −
2
Quine was the first philosopher to analyse all six grades of indiscernibility.
His fullest discussion of them ended as follows:
May there even be many intermediate grades? The question is
ill defined. By imposing special conditions on the form or con-
tent of the open sentence used in discriminating two objects, we
could define any number of intermediate grades of discriminabil-
ity, subject even to no linear order. What I have called moderate
discriminability [i.e. =p or ≈p], however, is the only intermediate
grade that I see how to define at our present high level of gener-
ality. [25, p. 116]
Quine was right that Definition 2.1 essentially exhausts all of the grades
of discrimination that are fairly natural, highly general, and which can be
defined in terms of satisfaction of L −- and L +-formulas.3 Nevertheless,
other grades of discrimination are quite natural; we just need to consider
2This family of definitions has a long philosophical heritage, e.g.: Hilbert and Bernays
[14, §5]; Quine [24, pp. 230–2], [25]; Caulton and Butterfield [8, §2.1, §3.2]; Ketland [16,
pp. 306–7], [17, Definitions 2.3, 2.5]; Ladyman et al. [18, Definition 3.1, §6.4].
3Though Caulton and Butterfield [8] and Ladyman et al. [18] also explore the case of
quantifier-free formulas.
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alternative methods of definition. (The sense in which they are ‘intermediate’
grades will become clear in §3 and, as Quine conjectured, we will see that
they are not linearly ordered.)
In particular, I shall introduce grades of discrimination that are defined
in terms of isomorphisms. As a reminder:
Definition 2.3. Let M,N be L -structures. An isomorphism from M toN is any bijection pi ∶M Ð→N such that:
1. e ∈ RM iff pi(e) ∈ RN , for all n-place L -predicates R and all e ∈Mn
2. pi(fM(e)) = fN (pi(e)), for all n-place L -function-symbols f and all
e ∈Mn
A symmetry on M is an isomorphism from M to M.
Isomorphisms preserve L +-formulas (see e.g. Marker [20, pp. 13–14]):
Lemma 2.4. Let M,N be L -structures, and pi ∶ M Ð→ N be an isomor-
phism. For all n < ω, all φ ∈ L +n and all e ∈Mn:
M ⊧ φ(e) iff N ⊧ φ(pi(e))
There is therefore a good sense in which objects linked by a symmetry can-
not be discriminated. Consequently, symmetries are a source of grades of
discrimination, and I shall be interested in three distinct grades of symmetry :
Definition 2.5. For any L -structure M with a, b ∈M :
1. a sm b in M iff there is a symmetry pi on M with pi(a) = b
2. a sp b in M iff there is a symmetry pi on M with pi(a) = b and pi(b) = a
3. a s b in M iff there is a symmetry pi on M with pi(a) = b, pi(b) = a and
pi(x) = x for all x ∉ {a, b}
These three grades have already received some philosophical attention;4 one
of my aims is to incorporate them into the discussion in a systematic way.
In defining the notion of an isomorphism, the only object-language sym-
bols which are mentioned are those of the signature; there is no need to
mention ‘=’. Nevertheless, the notion of an isomorphism—and hence each
grade of symmetry—straightforwardly depends upon the notion of identity.
After all, an isomorphism is a bijection, which is to say it maps unique
objects to unique objects, and vice versa. This dependence on identity is
reflected in Lemma 2.4: symmetries preserve L +-formulas.
If we want to avoid treating identity as a primitive—for philosophical or
technical reasons—then the notion of an isomorphism is probably too strong.
4
sm is considered by Ketland [16], [17] under the name ‘structural indiscernibility’, and
by Ladyman et al. [18] under the name ‘symmetry’. sp is considered by Ladyman et al.
[18] under the name ‘full symmetry’. s is considered by Ketland [16], [17], who writes
‘piab’ to indicate that a s b.
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In looking for a weaker notion, a first thought would be to consider functions
between structures that need not be bijections. (In this regard, strict homo-
morphisms are sometimes considered.) But this is insufficiently concessive,
since the very idea of a function presupposes the notion of identity, for a
function maps each object (or n-tuple) to a unique object. Instead, then, we
should consider structure-preserving relations that may hold between struc-
tures. The appropriate notion is provided by Casanovas et al. [7, Definition
2.5]; recall from §1 that dΠe abbreviates ⟨d1, e1⟩, . . . , ⟨dn, en⟩ ∈ Π:5
Definition 2.6. Let M,N be L -structures. A relativeness correspondence
from M to N is any relation Π ⊆M ×N with dom(Π) =M and rng(Π) = N
such that:
1. d ∈ RM iff e ∈ RN , for all n-place L -predicates R and all dΠe
2. fM(d)ΠfN (e), for all n-place L -function-symbols f and all dΠe
A relativity on M is a relativeness correspondence from M to M.
Casanovas et al. [7, Proposition 2.6] show that relativeness correspondences
preserve L −-formulas:
Lemma 2.7. Let M,N be L -structures, and Π be a relativeness corre-
spondence from M to N . For all n < ω, all φ ∈ L −n , and all dΠe:
M ⊧ φ(d) iff N ⊧ φ(e)
There is therefore a good sense in which objects linked by a relativity cannot
be discriminated. So, by simple analogy with the three grades of symmetry,
I shall consider three grades of relativity :
Definition 2.8. For any L -structure M with a, b ∈M :
1. a rm b in M iff there is a relativity Π on M with aΠb
2. a rp b in M iff there is a relativity Π on M with aΠb and bΠa
3. a r b in M iff there is a relativity Π on M with aΠb, bΠa and xΠx for
all x ≉ a and x ≉ b
Unlike the grades of symmetry, the grades of relativity have not yet been
considered by philosophers interested in grades of discrimination. However,
there is no principled reason for this omission. Indeed, a central claim of this
paper is that relativeness correspondences (and hence grades of relativity)
are the appropriate L −-surrogate for isomorphisms (and hence grades of
symmetry). This claim should already be plausible, given that we arrived
at the notion of a relativeness correspondence by relaxing the notion of an
isomorphism, and given the immediate comparison between Lemmas 2.4 and
2.7. The claim will receive further support during this paper.
5They credit a special case of this to Blok and Pigozzi [3, p. 343]; see also [28, §5].
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For the reader’s convenience, the following table summarises the twelve
grades of discrimination:
Grade Informal gloss Definition sketch= genuine identity a = b=p pairwise L +-indiscernibility φ(a, b)↔ φ(b, a), all φ ∈ L +2=m monadic L +-indiscernibility φ(a)↔ φ(b), all φ ∈ L +1
≈ complete L −-indiscernibility φ(a, e)↔ φ(b, e), all e and φ ∈ L −n≈p pairwise L −-indiscernibility φ(a, b)↔ φ(b, a), all φ ∈ L −2≈m monadic L −-indiscernibility φ(a)↔ φ(b), all φ ∈ L −1
s complete symmetry a permutation pi(a) = b, pi(b) = a
and pi(x) = x all x ∉ {a, b}
sp pairwise symmetry a permutation pi(a) = b, pi(b) = a
sm monadic symmetry a permutation pi(a) = b
r complete relativity a relativity aΠb, bΠa and xΠx all
x ≉ a,x ≉ b
rp pairwise relativity a relativity aΠb, bΠa
rm monadic relativity a relativity aΠb
3 Entailments between the grades
Having defined twelve grades of discrimination, my first task is to charac-
terise the relationships between them. More precisely: I shall build upon
some existing results (mentioned in endnotes) to provide a complete account
of the entailments and non-entailments between the various grades of dis-
crimination.
For any two grades of discrimination R and S, say that R entails S iff
for any structure M and any a, b ∈ M , if aRb then aSb in M. Entailment
is relativised to particular classes of structures—e.g. to structures with rela-
tional signatures—in the obvious way. In §7, I shall consider the special case
of entailments where we restrict our attention to finite structures. However,
the target result for this section is the general case:
Theorem 3.3 (Entailments between the grades). These Hasse Diagrams
characterise the entailments between our grades of discrimination:
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=s ≈
sp r
=p sm rp
=m ≈p rm
≈m
=
≈
s
sp r
=p sm rp
=m ≈p rm
≈m
The left diagram considers the case of arbitrary signatures; the right diagram
considers entailment when restricted to structures with relational signatures.
To explain the notation: there is a path down the page from R to S iff R
entails S. So in the case of arbitrary signatures: = entails ≈; ≈ does not
entail =; s does not entail ≈; and ≈ does not entail s. In the case of relational
signatures: ≈ entails s; hence ≈ entails sp; etc. I shall start by proving the
entailments:6
Lemma 3.1. For structures with arbitrary signatures:
1. = entails both ≈ and s
2. ≈ entails r
3. =p entails ≈p, and =m entails ≈m
4. =p entails =m, and ≈p entails ≈m
5. sp entails =p, and sm entails =m
6. rp entails ≈p, and rm entails ≈m
7. s entails r, sp entails rp, and sm entails rm
8. s entails sp, and sp entails sm
9. r entails rp, and rp entails rm
For structures with relational signatures, but not in general:
10. ≈ entails s
6Quine [25] proves case (4); see also Ketland [16, p. 307], [17, §3.2], Ladyman et al. [18,
Theorem 5.2]. Caulton and Butterfield [8, Theorem 1] prove case (5) when restricted to
relational signatures; see also Ketland [17, Lemma 3.22] and Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem
9.17, 9.20]. Ketland [17, Theorem 3.23] proves case (10).
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Proof. (1). The identity map is a symmetry.
(2). The relation given by xΠx iff x ≈ x is a relativity.
(3)–(4). Immediate from the definitions.
(5)–(6). Immediate from Lemmas 2.4 and 2.7.
(7). Every symmetry can be regarded as a relativity.
(8)–(9). Immediate from the definitions.
(10). If a ≈ b, then for any n < ω, any atomic formula φ ∈ L −n , and any
e ∈ (M ∖ {a, b})n, we have M ⊧ φ(a, e)↔ φ(b, e).
It remains to demonstrate the non-entailments:7
Lemma 3.2. For structures with relational signatures:
1. ≈ does not entail =
2. s does not entail ≈
3. r does not entail =m
4. sm does not entail ≈p
5. sp does not entail r
6. =p does not entail rm
Moreover, for structures with arbitrary signatures:
7. ≈ does not entail =m
Proof. (1). In this unlabelled graph, A, we have 1 ≈ 2 but 1 ≠ 2:
1 2
(2). In this unlabelled graph, B, we have 1 s 2 but 1 ≉ 2:
1 2
(3). In this unlabelled graph, C, we have 1 r 2 but 1 ≠m 2:
1 2 3
(4). In this unlabelled directed graph, D, we have 1 sm 2 but 1 ≉p 2:
1 2
4 3
7Ketland [17, p. 8] and Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 5.2] use A to prove case (1); see
also Button [5, p. 218] and Ketland [16, p. 309]. Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 9.17] use
B to prove case (2), noting that it is the analogue of Black’s [2] two-sphere world. Button
[5, p. 218], Ketland [16, p. 310] and Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 7.12] use an example
like C. Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 5.2] use an example like D. Caulton and Butterfield
[8, pp. 60–2] and Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 9.20] use examples like E .
9
(5). In D, again, we have 1 sp 3 but 1 /r 3.
(6). Let E be the disjoint union of a complete countably-infinite graph
with a complete uncountable graph, i.e.:
E ∶= R
RE ∶= {⟨n,m⟩ ∈ N2 ∣ n ≠m} ∪ {⟨p, q⟩ ∈ (R ∖N)2 ∣ p ≠ q}
By taking a Skolem Hull of E containing 1 ∈ N and any e ∈ R∖N, we see that
1 =p e. Now suppose that Π is a relativity with 1Πe. Since Π must preserve
the edges of the graph, and every element in either ‘cluster’ has an edge to
every element in the cluster except itself, Π must be a bijection between N
and R ∖N. Contradiction; so 1 /r
m
e.
(7). Augment A by adding a single constant which picks out 1.
It is simple to check that Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 yield Theorem 3.3. This
Theorem allows us to compare the consequences of imposing various grades
of discrimination as criteria of identity.
I should comment briefly on the philosophical significance of the construc-
tions used in Lemma 3.2. The existence of A is guaranteed by absolutely
standard model theory. However, A contains two distinct objects that are
‘blank’: from the perspective of A, these objects have no properties or rela-
tions to anything, so that their distinctness must be brute. And this might
suggest that the use of absolutely standard model theory begs the question
against anyone who believes in a non-trivial criterion of identity. Fortunately
it does not, but it is worth carefully explaining why.
Let Fran be a philosopher who advocates a non-trivial criterion of iden-
tity: in particular, Fran thinks that x and y are identical iff x ≈ y. However,
bearing in mind the discussion of §1—particularly of a signature which al-
lows us only to describe eye colour—Fran advances this criterion of identity
with respect to some particular signature, F . Now, if A is presented as
an F -structure, then Fran will certainly deny that A could exist. However,
Fran can make sense of A by regarding it as a G -structure, where G is a sig-
nature which is impoverished compared with F . Construed thus, A begs no
question against Fran, because it poses no threat to her proposed criterion
of identity.
To be clear: I am not trying to endorse or defend Fran’s position.8 My
point is simply that everyone, including Fran, can make sense of standard
model theory.
4 A Galois Connection
Theorem 3.3 graphically demonstrates that grades of symmetry are to grades
ofL +-indiscernibility as grades of relativity are to grades ofL −-indiscernibility.
8I was once on Fran’s side [5, p. 220]; but I have changed my mind [6, p. 211 n. 8].
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In this section, I develop this point by outlining a Galois Connection between
isomorphisms and relativeness correspondences. (The results of this section
can be fruitfully compared with those of Bonnay and Engstro¨m [4]; we dis-
covered our results independently.)
Lemma 2.4 has an obvious converse: every bijective map which preserves
all L +-formulas is an isomorphism. However, there is no converse to Lemma
2.7. To make this more precise, consider the following definition:
Definition 4.1. Let M,N be L -structures. A near-correspondence fromM to N is any relation Π ⊆M ×N with dom(Π) =M and rng(Π) = N such
that, for all n < ω, all φ ∈ L −n , and all dΠe:
M ⊧ φ(d) iff N ⊧ φ(e)
Lemma 2.7 states that every relativeness correspondence is a near-correspondence.
But the converse fails. Let F be an {f}-structure, defined as follows:
F = {1,2}
fF(1) = fF(2) = 2
Then Π = {⟨1,2⟩, ⟨2,1⟩} is clearly a near-correspondence from F to F , but
not a relativeness correspondence.
However, there is an elegant connection between near-correspondences
(and hence relativeness correspondences) and isomorphisms on the models
we obtain by quotienting using ≈. The use of such quotients is standard
in model theory without identity, and the central idea is summed up in
the following Definition and Lemma (see Casanovas et al. [7, Definition 2.3–
2.4]):9
Definition 4.2. Let M be any L -structure. Then M is the L -structure
obtained by quotienting M by ≈. We denote its members with aM = {b ∈
M ∣ a ≈ b in M} and, when no confusion can arise, we dispense with the
subscript, talking of a rather than aM. Now M is defined as follows:
M = {a ∣ a ∈M}
RM = {e ∈Mn ∣ e ∈ RM} all n-place L -predicates R
fM(e) = fM(e) all n-place L -function-symbols f and all e ∈Mn
Lemma 4.3. Let M be an L -structure. For all n < ω, all φ ∈ L −n and all
e ∈Mn:
M ⊧ φ(e) iff M ⊧ φ(e)
9Casanovas et al. trace the definition and lemma back to Monk [21, presumably Exer-
cises 29.33–34]. This has recently been rediscovered by philosophers, e.g. Ketland [16, p.
307 n. 10], [17, Theorem 3.12].
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Casanovas et al. [7, Proposition 2.6] note that there is a relativeness corre-
spondence from M to N iff M ≅ N . I wish to build on this; and I begin
with some definitions:
Definition 4.4. For any L -structures M,N :
1. N(M,N) is the set of near-correspondences from M to N
2. I(M,N) is the set of isomorphisms from M to N
3. e(M,N) ∶ I(M,N) Ð→N(M,N) is given by: apieb iff pi(a) = b
4. c(M,N) ∶ N(M,N) Ð→ I(M,N) is given by: Πc(a) = b iff there are
a′ ≈ a and b′ ≈ b such that a′Πb′
Say that Π ∈N(M,N) is maximal iff no strict superset of Π is in N(M,N).
I prove that these are genuine definitions, i.e. that e(M,N) and c(M,N)
are functions. I begin with e(M,N):
Lemma 4.5. If pi ∈ I(M,N), then pie is a relativeness correspondence, and
hence pie ∈N(M,N).
Proof. Fix n < ω and suppose that dpiee; i.e. that pi(d) = e. For each n-place
L-predicate R, observe:
d ∈ RM iff d ∈ RM iff pi(d) ∈ RN iff e ∈ RN iff e ∈ RN
For each n-place L-function-symbol f , observe:
pi(fM(d)) = pi(fM(d)) = fN (pi(d)) = fN (e) = fN (e)
so that fM(d)piefN (e). Hence pie is a relativeness correspondence, and so a
near-correspondence by Lemma 2.7.
To show that c(M,N) is a function, we need a subsidiary result:
Lemma 4.6. Let Π be a near-correspondence from M to N , with aΠb and
a′Πb′. Then a ≈ a′ in M iff b ≈ b′ in N .
Proof. Suppose a ≈ a′ in M; then using Lemmas 2.7 and 2.2:
N ⊧ φ(b, b) iff M ⊧ φ(a, a) iff M ⊧ φ(a, a′) iff N ⊧ φ(b, b′)
So b ≈ b′ in N , by Lemma 2.2. The converse is similar.
It follows that c(M,N) is a function:
Lemma 4.7. If Π ∈N(M,N), then Πc ∈ I(M,N).
Proof. Lemma 4.6 immediately yields that Πc(a) is a well-defined function,
and indeed an injection. Πc is a surjection, since rng(Π) = N . It remains to
12
show that Πc preserves structure. For the remainder of the proof, fix n < ω
and a, b ∈Mn such that Πc(a) = b.
Let R be any n-place L -predicate. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have a′i ≈ ai
and b′i ≈ bi such that a
′
iΠb
′
i; and hence:
a ∈ RM iff a′ ∈ RM iff b′ ∈ RN iff b ∈ RN iff Πc(a) ∈ RN
Let f be any n-place L -function-symbol. For all φ(v1, v2) ∈ L −2 , define
φf(v1, x) as φ(v1, f(x)); and let b′ ∈ N be such that fM(a)Πb′. Invoking
Lemma 2.2:
N ⊧ φ(b′, b′) iff M ⊧ φ(fM(a), fM(a))
iff M ⊧ φf(fM(a), a)
iff N ⊧ φf(b′, b)
iff N ⊧ φ(b′, fN (b))
Hence b′ ≈ fN (b) by Lemma 2.7. Now:
Πc(fM(a)) = Πc(fM(a)) = b′ = fN (b) = fN (b) = fN (Πc(a))
so that functions are preserved.
Lemmas 4.5 and 4.7 together show that Definition 4.4 is a proper definition.
Its significance resides in the following:
Theorem 4.8 (Galois Connection on ≈-quotients). For each Π ∈N(M,N)
and each pi ∈ I(M,N): Πc = pi iff Π ⊆ pie.
Proof. Left-to-right. Suppose Πc = pi. Fix ⟨d, e⟩ ∈ Π; then pi(d) = e, so dpiee.
Right-to-left. Suppose Π ⊆ pie. Where Πc(d) = e, there are d′ ≈ d and
e′ ≈ e such that d′Πe′ and hence d′piee′; so e = e′ = pi(d′) = pi(d). Hence
Πc(d) = pi(d), for all d ∈M .
This Theorem highlights the depth of the connection between isomorphisms
and relativeness correspondences. Additionally, it strengthens the claim that
relativeness correspondences are the L −-analogue of isomorphisms. For,
given that there are near-correspondences that are not relativeness corre-
spondences, one might have worried that relativeness correspondences com-
pete with the near-correspondences to be the L −-analogue of isomorphism.
However, the appearance of competition vanishes, once we consider some
consequences of the Galois Connection:
Lemma 4.9. For any L -structures M,N :
1. c(M,N) ○ e(M,N) is the identity function
2. e(M,N) ○ c(M,N) is idempotent
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3. If pi ∈ I(M,N), then pie is maximal
4. If Π ∈N(M,N), then (Πc)e is the unique maximal relativeness corre-
spondence that extends Π
Proof. (1)–(2). Immediate from the fact that this is a Galois Connection
with the partial-ordering on I(M,N) being identity.
(3). Let Σ ∈ I(M,N) be such that pie ⊆ Σ, and suppose aΣb. By Lemma
4.7, Σc ∈N(M,N), with Σc(a) = b. For any d such that apied, we have aΣd,
and hence Σc(a) = d, so that b ≈ d. Hence pi(a) = d = b, and so apieb.
(4). Lemma 4.5, our Galois Connection, and case (3) show that (Πc)e
is a maximal relativeness correspondence extending Π. To show uniqueness,
let Σ be any maximal relativeness correspondence extending Π. Consider
any a, b ∈ M such that a(Πc)eb. Then there are a′ ≈ a, b′ ≈ b such that
a′Πb′, and hence such that a′Σb′, since Π ⊆ Σ. Hence, for any dΣe, and any
φ ∈ L −n+1, by Lemma 2.7:
M ⊧ φ(a, d) iff M ⊧ φ(a′, d) iff N ⊧ φ(b′, e) iff N ⊧ φ(b, e)
Consequently, Θ = Σ ∪ {⟨a, b⟩} is a near-correspondence. So (Θc)e is a max-
imal relativeness correspondence extending Σ; but Σ is itself maximal, so
aΣb. Generalising, (Πc)e ⊆ Σ. Since (Πc)e is maximal, (Πc)e = Σ.
The preceding result tells us that every near-correspondence expands to a
relativeness correspondence. Accordingly, there is no genuine competition
between near-correspondences and relativeness correspondences. Indeed, in-
stead of defining the grades of relativity in terms of relativeness correspon-
dences, we could have defined them in terms of near-correspondences. Or,
even more simply, we could have defined them in terms of symmetries on
quotient models, as shown by the following immediate consequence of the
preceding results:
Lemma 4.10. For any L -structure M:
1. a rm b in M iff a sm b in M
2. a rp b in M iff a sp b in M
3. a r b in M iff a s b in M
5 Equivalence relations
At various points, I have described the grades of discrimination as behav-
ing like identity. A natural question is whether the grades of discrimination
behave like identity in being equivalence relations. (Note that I implicitly re-
lied upon the fact that ≈ is an equivalence relation in defining the ≈-quotient
structure.) Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 10.22] have partially answered this
question, in noting that =p and ≈p are not transitive (in general). The fol-
lowing result, which employs our Galois Connection, completes the picture.
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Theorem 5.1. =p, ≈p, sp and rp are reflexive and symmetric, but not transi-
tive (in general); the remaining eight grades of discrimination are equivalence
relations.
Proof. Consider the following coloured graph, G:
1 2
3
45
6
Here, 1 sp 2 and 2 sp 3, but 1 ≉p 3. By Theorem 3.3, this establishes that =p,≈p, sp and rp are not transitive (in general).
The reflexivity and symmetry of all the grades of indiscernibility are
immediate from their definitions, as is the transitivity of =, ≈, =m and ≈m.
It is routine to check that all three grades of symmetry are symmetric
and reflexive, and that s and sm are transitive. Lemma 4.10 entails that the
same is true for the respective grades of relativity.
Since identity is surely transitive, Theorem 5.1 might seem to provide a
knockdown argument against treating any of =p,≈p, sp and rp as a criterion
of identity. However, this point is a little more subtle than it might initially
seem.
Consider the discussion of A, at the end of §3. A might have seemed
to present a counterexample to treating ≈ as a criterion of identity. But
any philosopher who advocates such a criterion, such as Fran, will maintain
that we can make sense of A by (and only by) treating it as a structure of
some artificially restricted signature. At that point, A no longer presents a
counterexample to Fran’s proposed criterion of identity, which she advances
with respect to some richer signature.
With this in mind, consider Rach, a philosopher who advocates rp as a
criterion of identity. G might seem to pose problems for Rach. But if G is
presented with regard to Rach’s preferred signature, then it violates her pro-
posed criterion of identity even before we consider issues about transitivity:
after all, G is to contain objects which are distinct but (‘genuinely’) pair-
wise symmetric. Accordingly, Rach will maintain that we can make sense ofG by (and only by) treating it as a structure of some artificially restricted
signature. And at that point, G no longer demonstrates the non-transitivity
of Rach’s proposed criterion of identity, which she advances with respect to
some richer signature.
The situation, then, is slightly odd. From the perspective of anyone who
thinks that identity is more fine-grained than any of =p, ≈p, sp and rp, these
four grades of discrimination fail to behave like identity in an absolutely
crucial sense, in failing to be transitive. (This is why Ladyman et al. [18,
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p. 23] suggest that =p and ≈p violate a plausible ‘minimal requirement’ on
any notion of indiscernibility.) But it does not immediately follow that one
cannot propose one of these four grades as a criterion of identity.
6 Connections to definability theory
I now want to explore some natural technical questions which have not fea-
tured on the radar of philosophers interested in grades of discrimination.
These questions concern the relationship between grades of discrimination
and elementary extensions, and they relate to definability theory. My an-
swers to these questions, together with the Galois Connection of §4, will
yield interesting entailments between the different grades in special cases (to
be discussed in §7). To be clear on terminology:
Definition 6.1. Let M and N be L -structures. Say that M ≺+ N iff for
all n < ω, all φ ∈ L +n , and all e ∈Mn:
M ⊧ φ(e) iff N ⊧ φ(e)
Say that M≺− N iff the above holds with L −n in place of L +n .
There is a classic result connecting L +-indiscernibility with the existence of
a symmetry in some elementary extension (see e.g. Marker [20, Proposition
4.1.5]):
Theorem 6.2. For any L -structure M, the following are equivalent:
1. M ⊧ φ(a)↔ φ(b), for all φ ∈ L +n
2. There is an N ≻+ M and a symmetry pi on N such that pi(a) = b
For present purposes, the immediate import of Theorem 6.2 is that it yields
a new way to characterise =p and =m:
Lemma 6.3. For any L -structure M:
1. a =m b in M iff there is an N ≻+ M in which a sm b
2. a =p b in M iff there is an N ≻+ M in which a sp b
This raises a natural question: Is there an L −-analogue of Theorem 6.2?
There certainly is; but to show this, I need two definitions. First, I need the
ordinary notion of a diagram:10
Definition 6.4. Let L be any signature and X be any set. Then L (X) is
the signature formed by augmenting L with each member of X as a (new)
10Whilst this notion of diagram invokes ‘=’, Dellunde shows that there is a perfectly
workable notion of diagram which does not employ ‘=’.
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constant. Where M is an L -structure, Diag+(M) is the set of L +(M)-
sentences satisfied by the L (M)-structure formed by letting each e ∈ M
name itself.
Next, I need the L −-analogue for a partial elementary map:
Definition 6.5. Let M,N be L -structures. A proto-correspondence fromM to N is any relation Π ⊆M ×N such that, for all n < ω, all φ ∈ L −n , and
all dΠe:
M ⊧ φ(d) iff N ⊧ φ(e)
So a near-correspondence from M to N is a proto-correspondence with do-
main M and range N . The proof of the L −-analogue of Theorem 6.2 now
amounts to little more than a tweak to Marker’s proof of Theorem 6.2.11 I
start with two type-realising constructions:
Lemma 6.6. Let Π be a proto-correspondence from M to N . For any
a ∈ M , there is as an O ≻+ N with some b ∈ O such that Π ∪ {⟨a, b⟩} is a
proto-correspondence from M to O.
Proof. Define:
Γ = {φ(v, e) ∈ L −1 (rng(Π)) ∣ for some n < ω, some φ ∈ L −n+1, and some dΠe,
we have M ⊧ φ(a, d)}
Consider any φ(v, e) ∈ Γ; sinceM ⊧ ∃vφ(v, d) and Π is a proto-correspondence,N ⊧ ∃vφ(v, e). Equally, N can be treated as a model of Diag+(N). So any
finite subset of Γ∪Diag+(N) is satisfiable. Hence, by Compactness, there is
a model of Γ ∪Diag+(N), which we can regard as O ≻+ N . Now simply let
Σ = Π ∪ {⟨a, b⟩}, where O ⊧ Γ(b).
Lemma 6.7. Let Π be a proto-correspondence fromM to N withM≺+ N .
Then there is some O ≻+ N and a proto-correspondence Σ ⊇ Π−1 from N toO with dom(Σ) = N .
Proof. We construct an elementary chain. Since Π is a proto-correspondence
and M≺+ N , we have that for all φ ∈ L −n and all aΠb:
N ⊧ φ(b) iff M ⊧ φ(a) iff N ⊧ φ(a)
11In more detail: my Lemma 6.6 tweaks Marker’s Lemma 4.16; my Lemma 6.7 tweaks
Marker’s Corollary 4.1.7 (cf. also Casanovas et al.’s [7] Lemma 2.7); and my Lemma 6.8
tweaks Marker’s Proposition 4.1.5. The main difference is that I use proto-correspondences
rather than partial elementary maps, and in the final step I require a detour, via Lemma
4.9, to obtain a relativity.
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Defining O0 = N and Σ0 = Π−1, observe that Σ0 is a proto-correspondence
from N to O0. This is our initial stage in the chain.
Now let {eα ∣ α < κ} exhaustively enumerate N , let Dα = dom(Σ0)∪{eβ ∣
β < α} for each α < κ, and proceed recursively:
— Stage α + 1: Given a proto-correspondence Σα from N to Oα with
dom(Σα) = Dα, use Lemma 6.6 to obtain an Oα+1 ≻+ Oα and a proto-
correspondence Σα+1 ⊇ Σα from N to Oα+1 with dom(Σα+1) =Dα+1.
— Stage α, with α a limit ordinal: let Oα = ⋃β<αOβ and Σα = ⋃α<β Σβ .
Now let O = ⋃α<κNα and Σ = ⋃α<κΣα.
Lemma 6.8. Let M be an L -structure with a, b ∈ Mn such that M ⊧
φ(a) ↔ φ(b) for all φ ∈ L −n . Then there is some N ≻+ M and a near-
correspondence Π from N to N such that aΠb.
Proof. Given M, a, b as described, we have a proto-correspondence Π0 fromM to M with aΠ0b. Setting M = M0 = N0, we can repeatedly apply
Lemma 6.7 to construct an elementary chain (solid arrows indicate a proto-
correspondence):
M0 M1 M2 . . .
N0 N1 N2 . . .
Π0 Π1 Π2Σ0 Σ1
where both Σi ⊆ Π−1i ⊆ Σi+1 and Mi ≺+ Ni ≺+ Mi+1 for each i < ω. Define:
N = ⋃
i<ω
Ni = ⋃
i<ω
Mi
Π = ⋃
i<ω
Πi
It is routine to check that Π and N have the required properties.
We can now obtain our L −-analogue of Theorem 6.2:
Theorem 6.9. For any L -structure M, the following are equivalent:
1. M ⊧ φ(a)↔ φ(b), for all every φ ∈ L −n
2. There is an N ≻+ M and a relativity Π on N such that aΠb
3. There is an N ≻− M and a relativity Π on N such that aΠb
Proof. (1)⇒ (2). Use Lemma 6.8 to obtain a near-correspondence, then use
Lemma 4.9 to extend this to a relativity.
(2) ⇒ (3). Trivial.
(3) ⇒ (1). Π is a relativity, and hence a near-correspondence by Lemma
2.7; the result now follows since M≺− N .
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This Theorem lends yet more weight to the claim that relativeness corre-
spondences are the L −-analogue of symmetries. Moreover, it immediately
yields a new way to characterise ≈p and ≈m (compare Lemma 6.3):
Lemma 6.10. For any L -structure M:
1. a ≈m b in M iff there is an N ≻+ M in which a rm b
2. a ≈p b in M iff there is an N ≻+ M in which a rp b
Moreover, both claims hold with ≻− in place of ≻+.
Before continuing with the main aims of this paper, it is worth briefly stop-
ping to smell the roses. Theorem 6.2 is sometimes used as a stepping stone
to the following foundational result of definability theory (notation clarified
in endnote):12
Theorem 6.11 (Beth–Svenonius Theorem, L +-case). For any L -structureM with R ∉ L and U ⊆Mn, the following are equivalent:
1. (M, U) ⊧ ∀v(φ(v)↔ Rv) for some φ ∈ L +n .
2. For every (N , V ) ≻+ (M, U) and every symmetry pi of N : V = pi(V ).
3. For any L -structure N and any sets V0, V1 ⊆ Nn: if (N , V0), (N , V1)
and (M, U) all satisfy the same L +-sentences, then V0 = V1.
Pleasingly, we can use Theorem 6.9 as a stepping-stone to an L −-analogue
of this result; indeed, the main steps are exactly as in the L +-case:13
Theorem 6.12 (Beth–Svenonius Theorem, L +-case). For any L -structureM with R ∉ L and U ⊆Mn, the following are equivalent:
1. (M, U) ⊧ ∀v(φ(v)↔ Rv) for some φ ∈ L −n .
2. For every (N , V ) ≻+ (M, U) and every relativity Π of N : V = Π(V )
3. For every (N , V ) ≻− (M, U) and every relativity Π of N : V = Π(V )
4. For any L -structure N and any sets V0, V1 ⊆ Nn: if (N , V0), (N , V1)
and (M, U) all satisfy the same L −-sentences, then V0 = V1.
12Beth [1] proved (1) ⇔ (3); Svenonius [27] proved (1) ⇔ (2). (M, U) is the L ∪{R}-
structure formed from M by allowing R to pick out U . As one would expect, pi(V ) =
{pi(e) ∣ e ∈ V }, and equally Π(V ) = {e ∣ there are d ∈ V such that dΠe}.
13The only difficult step in either Theorem is (2) ⇒ (1). For the L +-case, see e.g.
Poizat [23, Proposition 9.2]. To prove the L −-case, we simply tweak Poizat’s proof by
invoking Theorem 6.9 rather than Theorem 6.2, and considering n-types in the sense of
L
−
n
, rather than L +
n
. Dellunde [10, p. 5] and Keisler and Miller [15, p. 3] have shown
that L −n -types behave as one would hope.
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7 Entailments in the finitary case
The results of the previous section immediately yield a special case of Theo-
rem 3.3, obtained by restricting our attention to finitary structures.14 This
special case has already attracted some attention, since it is philosophically
interesting,15 and the following result completes the picture.
Theorem 7.1 (Entailments between the grades, finite structures). These
Hasse Diagrams characterise the entailments between our grades of discrim-
ination, when we restrict our attention to finite structures:
=
s ≈
=p, sp r
=m, sm ≈p, rp
≈m, rm
=
≈
s
=p, sp r
=m, sm ≈p, rp
≈m, rm
The left diagram is restricted to finite structures with arbitrary signatures;
the right diagram is restricted to finite structures with relational signatures.
Proof. Most of this is supplied by Theorem 3.3. For the remainder observe
that if M is finite, then N ≻+ M iff M=N . It follows from Lemma 6.3 that=p entails sp and that =m entails sm; and similarly with Lemma 6.10.
14An alternative route to Theorem 7.1 merits comment. We can use finitary isomor-
phism systems to prove the coincidence of grades of L +-indiscernibility with grades of
symmetry in finite structures, without invoking the results from §6. (For an introduction
to finitary isomorphism systems, see Ebbinghaus et al. [11, chapter XI].) Casanovas et al.
[7, Definitions 4.1–4.2] define the L −-analogue of finitary isomorphism systems. It
turns out that we can use these, analogously, to prove the coincidence of grades of L −-
indiscernibility with grades of relativity in finite structures.
15Caulton and Butterfield [8, Theorem 2] prove a special case of the mutual entail-
ment between sp and =p, and sm and =m, on the assumption that L is finite and rela-
tional. Ketland’s [17, p. 2] attention is entirely restricted to finite relational signatures.
Linnebo and Muller [19, Theorem 3] note that witness-discernibility (a further notion,
which I have not discussed) is equivalent to ≈p in finite structures, and outline several
reasons for focussing on finite structures.
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However, a little work will yield an even stronger result: the grades of rela-
tivity and the grades of L −-indiscernibility also entail each other when the
structure’s ≈-quotient is finite. To show this, we need a few results. The
first tells us when ≈ is definable in a structure:16
Lemma 7.2. LetM be any L -structure. If either L is finite and relational
or M is finite, then there is an L −
2
-formula which defines ≈ in M. However,
the restrictions are necessary.
Proof. Case when L is finite and relational. Let φ1, . . . , φn enumerate all
the atomic L -formulas. By Lemma 2.2, the following L −
2
-formula defines ≈
in M:
n
⋀
i=1
∀v(φi(x, v)↔ φi(y, v))
Case whenM is finite. Let e1, . . . , em exhaustively enumerateM without
repetition. So for all i ≠ j between 1 andm, we have ei ≈ ej ; hence by Lemma
2.2 there is some φi,j ∈ L −2 such that M ⊭ φi,j(ei, ei) ↔ φi,j(ei, ej), and so
the following L −
2
-formula defines ≈ in M:
⋀
i≠j
(φi,j(x,x)↔ φi,j(x, y))
The necessity of the restrictions. Let L contain one-place predicates Pi
for all i < ω, and a single two-place predicate R. Define:
H ∶=N
PHi ∶={6i,6i + 1}, for all 0 < i < ω
RH ∶={⟨2,1⟩, ⟨1,0⟩} ∪ {⟨2,6n − 2⟩, ⟨6n − 2,6n⟩, ⟨6n − 2,6n + 2⟩ ∣ 0 < n < ω} ∪
{⟨3,6n − 1⟩, ⟨6n − 1,6n + 1⟩, ⟨6n − 1,6n + 3⟩ ∣ 0 < n < ω}
We can represent H more perspicuously as follows:
2 4 6
8
P1
10 12
14
P2
16 18
20
P3
⋮
1 0
7 5 3
9
13 11
15
19 17
21
⋮
16For the case where L is finite and relational, see Ketland [17, Definition 2.3].
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I claim that H ⊧ φ(2)↔ φ(3) for all φ ∈ L −
1
. To prove this, fix φ ∈ L −
1
and
let K be the (necessarily finite) set of L -predicates appearing in φ. WhereH∗ is the K -reduct of H, we have 2 sp 3 in H∗, and hence 2 rp 3 in H∗
by Lemma 4.10. Lemma 2.7 now yields that H∗ ⊧ φ(2)↔ φ(3), and henceH ⊧ φ(2)↔ φ(3). Now apply Lemma 4.3.
However, where ψ ∈ L +
1
abbreviates:
∃x(Rvx ∧∀y∀z((Rxy ∧Rxz) → y = z)))
we have H ⊧ ψ(2)∧¬ψ(3). So no L −
2
-formula can define = in H; and hence
no L −
2
-formula can define ≈ in H, by Lemma 4.3.
We already knew that a ≈ b in M iff a = b in M. Lemma 7.2 allows us,
under special circumstances, to obtain analogous results for our other grades
of indiscernibility:
Lemma 7.3. LetM be any L -structure. If either L is finite and relational
or M is finite, then:
1. a ≈p b in M iff a =p b in M
2. a ≈m b in M iff a =m b in M
Proof. By Lemma 7.2, given either assumption, some L −
2
-formula defines ≈
in M. The same formula defines = in M, and the result follows via Lemma
4.3.
Finally, the Galois Connection of §4 allows us to extend Theorem 7.1, as
desired:
Lemma 7.4. For structures with finite ≈-quotients:
1. ≈p entails rp, and vice versa
2. ≈m entails rm, and vice versa.
Proof. Combine Theorem 7.1 with Lemmas 7.3 and 4.10.
Note that Theorem 7.1 does not hold for grades ofL +-discernibility/symmetry.
To see this, let E∗ be a superstructure of E obtained by making R reflexive.
Whilst E∗ has only two members and its signature is finite and relational,
no symmetry on E∗ sends 1 to any element in R ∖N.
8 Capturing grades of discrimination
All twelve grades of discrimination have fairly straightforward definitions.
However, the grades of indiscernibility are defined in terms of satisfaction
of object-language formulas, whereas the grades of symmetry and relativity
are defined are defined metalinguistically. It is natural to ask whether this
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is essential. More precisely, I shall ask which of the grades are capturable, in
the following sense:
Definition 8.1. For any L -structure M, say that Γ ⊆ L2 captures R in M
iff:
for all a, b ∈M ∶ aRb in M iff M ⊧ φ(a, b) for every φ ∈ Γ
Say that R is capturable+ in M iff some Γ ⊆ L +
2
captures R in M (similarly
for capturable−). Say that R is universally capturable+ iff some single Γ ⊆ L +
2
captures R in every L -structure (similarly for universally capturable−).
I shall consider capturability for each of the three families of grades of dis-
crimination, starting with the grades of indiscernibility:
Lemma 8.2. 1. =, =p, =m are universally capturable+
2. ≈, ≈p, ≈m are universally capturable−
3. There is a structure in which none of =, =p and =m is capturable−
Proof. (1) and (2). Obvious.
(3). Let I be the following graph:
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
For all φ ∈ L −
2
, I ⊧ φ(1,4)↔ φ(1,7) even though 1 =p 4 and 1 ≠m 7.
Lemma 8.3. 1. s is universally capturable+
2. For finite structures: sp and sm are universally capturable+
3. There is a structure in which sp and sm are not capturable+
4. There is a finite structure in which none of s, sp and sm is capturable−
Proof. (1). For each atomic φ ∈ L +n+2, define:
x ≃φ y ∶= ∀v ( n⋀
i=1
(vi ≠ x ∧ vi ≠ y)→ [φ(x, y, v)↔ φ(y, x, v)])
By Lemma 2.4, s is universally captured+ by the set of all such ≃φ.
(2). From Theorem 7.1 and Lemma 8.2.
(3). Let J comprise two disjoint copies of the complete countable graph,
with a disjoint copy of a complete uncountable graph, i.e.:
J ∶=R
RJ ∶={⟨m,n⟩ ∈ N2 ∣m ≠ n and m + n is even} ∪ {⟨p, q⟩ ∈ (R ∖N)2 ∣ p ≠ q}
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By taking a Skolem Hull containing 1,2 and some e ∈ R ∖N, it is clear that:
J ⊧ φ(1,2)↔ φ(1, e)
for any φ ∈ L +
2
. However, 1 sp 2 in J , whereas 1 /sm e in J .
(4) In I from Lemma 8.2, 1 s 2, whereas 7 /s
m
8. However, for all φ ∈ L −
2
,I ⊧ φ(1,2)↔ φ(7,8) and hence I ⊧ φ(1,2)↔ φ(7,8).
Lemma 8.4. 1. r is universally capturable−
2. For structures with finite ≈-quotients: rp and rm are universally captu-
rable−
3. There is a structure in which neither of rp and rm is capturable+
Proof. (1). Let Γ be the set of all L −
2
-formulas of the form:
∀v ( n⋀
i=1
[φi(x,x) ∧ ¬φi(x, vi) ∧ ψi(y, y) ∧ ¬ψi(y, vi)] → [θ(x, y, v)↔ θ(y, x, v)])
for any n < ω, any φ1, . . . , φn, ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ L −2 , and any θ ∈ L −n+2. I claim
that Γ captures r in any L -structure M.
First, suppose a r b in M. Fix some γ ∈ Γ, and some e ∈ Mn. Suppose
that:
M ⊧ n⋀
i=1
[φi(a, a) ∧ ¬φi(a, ei) ∧ψi(b, b) ∧ ¬ψi(b, ei)]
Then by Lemma 2.2, ei ≉ a and ei ≉ b for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since a r b, Lemma
2.7 tells us thatM ⊧ θ(a, b, e)↔ θ(b, a, e). Hence M ⊧ γ(a, b), for any γ ∈ Γ.
Next, suppose M ⊧ γ(a, b), for all γ ∈ Γ. I claim that the following is a
near-correspondence from M to M:
Π = {⟨a, b⟩, ⟨b, a⟩} ∪ {⟨x,x⟩ ∣ x ≉ a and x ≉ b}
To show this, fix n < ω, θ ∈ L −n+2 and e ∈ Mn such that ei ≉ a and ei ≉ b
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since each ei ≉ a and ei ≉ b, by Lemma 2.2 there are
formulas φi, ψi ∈ L −2 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that M ⊧ φi(a, a) ∧ ¬φi(a, ei)
and M ⊧ ψi(b, b) ∧ ¬ψi(b, ei). Conjoining these, we get:
M ⊧ n⋀
i=1
[φi(a, a) ∧ ¬φi(a, ei) ∧ ψi(b, b) ∧ ¬ψi(b, ei)]
Since M ⊧ γ(a, b) for all γ ∈ Γ, we obtain that, for all θ ∈L −n+2:
M ⊧ θ(a, b, e)↔ θ(b, a, e)
Generalising, Π is a near-correspondence. By the Galois Connection of The-
orem 4.8, (Πc)e is a relativity on M; and so a r b.
(2). From Lemmas 7.4 and 8.2.
(3). Exactly as in Lemma 8.3, case (3).
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Lemmas 8.2–8.4 can be summarised as follows:
Theorem 8.5 (Capturing the grades). The following table exhaustively
details the capturability of each grade of discrimination:
Grade Capturable+ Capturable−= ✓ ×=p ✓ ×=m ✓ ×
≈ ✓ ✓≈p ✓ ✓≈m ✓ ✓
s ✓ ×
sp f ×
sm f ×
r ✓ ✓
rp fq fq
rm fq fq
The table of Theorem 8.5 should be read with the following key:✓ universally capturable× there is an L -structure in which the grade is not capturable
f universally capturable when we restrict attention to finite structures;
but there are counterexamples elsewhere
fq universally capturable when we restrict attention to structures with
finite ≈-quotients; but there are counterexamples elsewhere
This demonstrates, once again, that grades of L +-discernibility are to grades
of symmetry, as grades of L −-discernibility are to grades of relativity. More
interestingly, though, Theorem 8.5 bears directly upon the philosophical
search for reductive criteria of identity.
As mentioned in §1, much of the interest in grades of discrimination
comes from their potential to provide us with a criterion of identity, possibly
a reductive one. However, if a grade of discrimination cannot be captured
by some set of formulas in the object language, this should bar it from
use in any reductive criterion of identity. After all, if the grade must be
invoked as a primitive at the level of the object language, it is unclear why
we should not simply allow ourselves to take identity itself as a primitive in
the object language. The situation will be no better, in this regard, if the
grade can only be captured+ and not captured−. Consequently, no grade of
L +-indiscernibility or symmetry can provide a reductive criterion of identity.
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The remaining candidates for reductive criteria of identity are therefore
the grades of L −-indiscernibility and relativity. However, in the special cases
when they are capturable−—which we require if we seek a reductive criterion
of identity—two of the grades of L −-indiscernibility are simply co-extensive
with two of the grades of L −-indiscernibility (see Theorem 7.1). Hence the
only plausible distinct candidates for a reductive criterion of identity are, in
order of entailment: ≈, r, ≈p and ≈m.
This does not show, though, that the remaining grades of discrimination
are philosophically uninteresting. After all, we might simply be interested in
providing an illuminating but non-reductive answer to the general question:
When are objects identical? To repeat an example from §1: if we have
become convinced that nature abhors a (non-trivial) symmetry, then sm could
serve as a non-reductive, non-trivial criterion of identity, even though it is
uncapturable+.
9 Symmetry in all elementary extensions
In §6, I connected the grades of indiscernibility with the existence of a sym-
metry/relativity in some elementary extensions. To close this paper, I wish
to consider what happens when we consider the existence of a symmetry or
relativity in all elementary extensions. In particular, I shall demonstrate
a neat connection between ≈ and symmetries in elementary extensions. To
show this, I first require a general method for constructing such elementary
extensions:17
Lemma 9.1. LetM be an L -structure with a ∈M , and let D be a set such
that M ∩D = ∅. Then there is an L -structure N ≻− M with N = M ∪D,
such that a ≈ d in N for all d ∈D.
Proof. Define σ ∶ N Ð→M by: σ(x) = x if x ∈M , and σ(d) = a if d ∈ D. Set:
RN = {e ∈ Nn ∣ σ(e) ∈ RM} all n-place L -predicates R
fN (e) = fM(σ(e)) all n-place L -function-symbols f and all e ∈ Nn
I claim that, for each L -term τ , all d ∈Dm and all e ∈Mn:
τN (d, e) = τN (a, e) = τM(a, e)
(where ai = a for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m). This is proved by induction on complexity.
The case where τ is an L -function symbol is given. Now suppose the claim
17Monk [21, Theorem 29.16] described this explicitly; Grzegorczyk [12, p. 41] earlier
mentioned it in passing, implying it was mathematical folklore. The method was redis-
covered by philosophers, e.g. Ketland [17, p. 7] and Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 8.14].
However, all these authors restrict their attentions to relational signatures.
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holds for τ1, . . . , τk and consider τ(x, y) = f(τ1(x, y), . . . , τk(x, y)). Then:
τN (d, e) = fN (τN1 (d, e), . . . , τNk (d, e))= fN (τN1 (a, e), . . . , τNk (a, e)) = τN (a, e)= fN (τM1 (a, e), . . . , τMk (a, e))= fM(τM
1
(a, e), . . . , τMk (a, e)) = τM(a, e)
This proves the claim. Hence, for all atomic φ ∈ L −m+n, all d ∈ Dm and all
e ∈Mn:
N ⊧ φ(d, e) iff N ⊧ φ(a, e) iff M ⊧ φ(a, e)
So for all d ∈D we have a ≈ d inN by Lemma 2.2; and moreover N ≻− M.
Thus armed, I can connect ≈ with symmetry in elementary extensions:
Lemma 9.2. For any L -structure M: if a sm b in every N ≻− M, then
a ≈ b in M.
Proof. Suppose a sm b in every N ≻− M. Let D be such that M ∩D = ∅
and ∣D∣ > ∣bM∣. Construct N as in Lemma 9.1, so that a ≈ d in N for all
d ∈D. Since N ≻− M, by assumption there is a symmetry pi on N such that
pi(a) = b. So, for every φ ∈ L −
2
, and all d ∈D, by Lemma 2.4:
N ⊧ φ(b, b) iff N ⊧ φ(a, a) iff N ⊧ φ(a, d) iff N ⊧ φ(b, pi(d))
Hence pi(d) ∈ bN for every d ∈ D, by Lemma 2.2. Since pi is a bijection,∣D∣ = ∣{pi(d) ∣ d ∈D}∣ ≤ ∣bN ∣. If a ≉ b in N , then ∣bN ∣ = ∣bM∣, contradicting our
choice of D; so a ≈ b in N . Since M ≺− N and ≈ is universally capturable−
by Lemma 8.2, a ≈ b in M.
Theorem 3.3 (left-diagram) entails us that there is no converse to 9.2 in the
general case. However, we do obtain a converse in restricted circumstances:
Lemma 9.3. When L is relational, for any L -structure M: a ≈ b in M iff
a sm b in every N ≻− M.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 3.3 and Lemmas 8.2 and 9.2.
Moreover, we can strengthen Lemma 9.2 in the case of s.
Lemma 9.4. LetM be an L -structure with a ∈M and e ∉M . Let N ≻− M
be constructed as in Lemma 9.1, so that N = M ∪ {e} and a ≈ e in N . If
a s b in N , then a ≈ b in M.
27
Proof. Suppose a s b in N , i.e. pi(a) = b, pi(b) = a, and pi(x) = x for all
x ∉ {a, b} is a symmetry on N . In particular, pi(e) = e. Hence, invoking
Lemma 2.4, for all φ ∈ L −
2
: M ⊧ φ(a, a) iff N ⊧ φ(a, a) iff N ⊧ φ(e, a) iffN ⊧ φ(e, b) iff N ⊧ φ(a, b) iff M ⊧ φ(a, b). Hence a ≈ b in M by Lemma
2.2.
However, this strengthening of Lemma 9.2 is limited to the case of s. To see
this, let K comprise two disjoint copies of the complete countable graph, i.e.:
K = N
RK = {⟨m,n⟩ ∈ N2 ∣m ≠ n and m + n is even}
Whilst 1 ≉ 2 in K, we can use Lemma 9.1 to add a single new element, e,
such that 1 ≈ e, without disrupting the fact that 1 sp 2. Moreover, nothing
like Lemma 9.2 holds for relativities: Lemma 8.4 tells us that a r b in M iff
a r b in all N ≻− M.
The results of §6 exhaustively detailed the connections between grades of
discernibility and the existence of a symmetry/relativity in some elementary
extension. The results of this section now exhaustively detail the connections
between grades of discernibility and the existence of a symmetry/relativity in
all elementary extensions. We thus have complete answers to several natural
questions concerning the connection between grades of discrimination and
elementary extensions.
10 Concluding remarks
Several recent technical-cum-philosophical papers have explored some of the
grades of discrimination. This paper has pressed forward that technical
investigation in many ways. To close, I shall emphasise two.
First, I have introduced grades of relativity to the philosophical literature—
along with the notion of a near-correspondence, a relativeness correspon-
dence, and a partial relativeness correspondence—and shown that these are
the natural L −-analogues of the grades of symmetry.
Second, I have offered complete answers to the natural questions that
arise concerning all twelve grades of discrimination. Indeed, the technical
investigation of the grades of discrimination now seems to be complete.18
18Huge thanks to Øystein Linnebo and Sean Walsh, whose questions provided much of
the original motivation for this paper, and whose subsequent comments were very helpful.
Further thanks to Denis Bonnay, Adam Caulton, Fredrik Engstro¨m, Jeffrey Ketland,
Richard Pettigrew, a referee for RSL, and a referee for this journal.
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